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Abstract: In this paper I review some of the theoretical issues surrounding metaphor,
investigating the understanding of metaphor-based constructions from a developmen-
tal psycholinguistic view. Reviewing the classification of metaphorical expressions, I
elaborate on the morphological aspect of idioms; thus on the typology of metaphors,
distinguishing them on the basis of their decomposability and conventionality (Gibbs
1994). I hypothesize a new, mentalistic model of interpretation, in which our mentaliz-
ing, intention-reading skills play a key role in deciphering intended (figurative) meaning.
Furthermore, I point out the importance of decomposability and conventionality determin-
ing our interpretative processes; both factors playing a facilitating role in interpretation.
Keywords: conceptual metaphor, social cognitive skills, theory of mind, metarepresen-
tation, intended meaning
1. Introduction
The problem of idiomatic language processing and acquisition is an is-
sue of deep concern in today’s psycholinguistics (Sperber–Wilson 1986;
Baron-Cohen–Tager-Flusberg 1993; Gibbs 1994; Tomasello 1999; Nor-
bury 2005). The increased interest surrounding the topic is due to its
importance in both thinking and speaking. That is, the questions arising
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in terms of non-literal language use and understanding yields answers
that may contribute to the resolution of cognitive psychological and lin-
guistic problems to a great extent, giving us an insight into the processes
and mechanisms our mind relies on when we think and speak; abilities
seemingly so simple that we take them for granted.
Embedding my research into a pragmatic background, I propose a
cognitive psychological theory for the acquisition of idioms and thus for
figurative language understanding. I outline the major models of me-
taphor processing, discuss their shortcomings and their efficiency, and
trace through the changing conceptualization of metaphors and idioms
from the traditional to the cognitive linguistic views. I aim to answer two
questions both of which are in the focus of attention in today’s cognitive
psychological and linguistic research on idiomaticity: first, the processing
of idioms and metaphorical expressions, and second, their acquisition and
the mastering of pragmatic competence. As for the interpretation of non-
literal constructions, my research demonstrates that figurative language
understanding is based on similar, but not the same processes as literal
language use (hence the equivalence of time in processing), which is in
harmony with Gibbs’ experimental results and their implications (Gibbs
1994). An important, however, in itself probably not sufficient factor in
figurative language use is theory of mind, which is also a prerequisite
for pragmatic competence, thus, for the mastering of non-literal, indirect
expressions so common in everyday conversations.
1.1. Tradition vs. innovation
The traditional view of figurative language (Aristotle 1996; Kövecses
2002) sees metaphor and non-literal expressions as representing an ex-
traordinary, distorted way of putting thoughts, which could be expressed
in a conventional, i.e., literal manner. Later on—the traditional view
states—such figurative expressions have become conventional in language
use, and thus they do not really count as metaphorical.1 As opposed to
these traditional convictions, the cognitive view sees metaphor as an inte-
gral part of our everyday language, which is not a distorted, complicated
1 As we will see, we do have a class of the so-called dead metaphors, (bottle’s neck,
chair’s back, table’s leg) which we do not consider metaphorical, since they are
so common in language that we practically have no other way (more literal in
nature) to refer to them.
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way of expressing ourselves, but one facilitating interpretation, often al-
lowing us to convey thoughts which cannot be expressed literally, or could
only be circumscribed in a lengthy manner.
Another important aspect of the traditional view is that it sees me-
taphors as elements strictly belonging to language. They are consid-
ered linguistic expressions, pertaining to the domain of poetics and ver-
bal games. The innovative, cognitive view represented by Lakoff–John-
son (1980) falsifies these views, and states that metaphor is an element
of thought. They thus delegate non-literal expressions to a non-verbal
modality, breaking away from the domain of linguistics per se, investi-
gating metaphor as a part of our conceptual system.
1.2. Current theories on metaphor understanding
Metaphor, like all figurative language, has been usually explained as a
secondary linguistic process taking place on literal language. However,
this explanation does not fit well with recent findings in psycholinguistic
and cognitive studies (Glucksberg–Keysar 1990; Burt 1992; Gibbs 1994).
Metaphors are commonly defined as non-literal expressions, characteriz-
ing one thing in terms of another, juxtaposing concepts from separate
domains of experience on the basis of a conceptual analogy (anger is
heat) (Gentner–Bowdle 2001).
There are two current theories that attempt to explain both cogni-
tive aspects of metaphor: the highlighting of common information, and
the projection of new information from vehicle to topic (Gentner–Bowdle
2001). One argues for metaphor functioning as an analogy (Lakoff–John-
son 1980), while the other view (Glucksberg et al. 1992) likens metaphor
to category inclusion, that is, it sees metaphors as category statements.
Along with the Lakoff and Johnson view (1980), Gibbs (1992; 1994)
claims that long-term memory is structurally organized by prototypes
extended by metaphoric and metonymic principles called conceptual me-
taphors or conceptual mappings. A conceptual metaphor, such as love
is a journey, is constituted by conceptual mappings between the two
domains that make up the metaphor, the target (abstract, e.g., anger)
and the source (concrete, e.g., heat) domain. In the appropriate context,
most conventional metaphoric expressions, such as we are at a crossroads
or our marriage is on the rocks access these conceptual metaphors from
the long-term memory.
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In the attributive category theory of Glucksberg et al. (1992) meta-
phors are understood as class inclusion statements. They claim that the
metaphor a suburb is a parasite asserts that suburbs can be classified as
parasites. Not literally, of course (since a suburb is not an organism),
but figuratively (something that lives off the resources of another entity).
In a metaphor one asserts that the topic (the first term, e.g., suburb) is
a member of the category of which the vehicle (the second term, e.g.,
parasite) is a prototypical member (Gentner–Bowdle 2001, 20). Once
this figurative meaning has been invoked from the vehicle, the metaphor
is interpreted successfully.
Glucksberg et al. (1992) thus argue for a class inclusion view, which
means that some metaphorical expressions build up an ad-hoc category in
the working memory, even when it would be expected that these idioms
rely on analogical mappings (a conceptual metaphor). By assigning the
topic suburb to this metaphorical category, its properties derived from the
vehicle (parasite) can be attributed to the topic. In this view, metaphors
are processed differently from literal statements—this prediction, how-
ever, has not been reliably borne out in empirical studies (Gibbs 1994;
Burt 1992).
As we will see, most researchers in current psycholinguistic experi-
ments on figurative meaning believe that the processes involved in com-
prehending metaphorical language are much the same as those used for
literal language. Something category theories do not give answer for, how-
ever, is what makes the listener/reader create the figurative meaning—
i.e., a metaphorical category instead of using the literal meaning of the
vehicle (Gentner–Bowdle 2001). The mentalistic model proposed in this
paper tries to go behind the scenes and map the cognitive background
mechanisms of such interpretation.
1.2.1. The conceptual metaphor theory
The turning point brought by the cognitive approach, introduced most
importantly by Lakoff and Johnson’s book Metaphors we live by (1980),
created the first paths of convergence of linguistics to psychology, and
thus laid down the foundations of conceptual analysis of linguistic phe-
nomena. Their impressive theory of conceptual metaphor represents a
mentalistic approach, investigating mental structures, and analyzing the
cognitive background of those linguistic expressions we consider meta-
phors, idioms.
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As opposed to the traditional theories presuming that idioms, such as
flip one’s lid, blow one’s top, are isolated, conventionalized expressions
and non-compositional, arbitrary constructions whose meaning cannot
be predicted from the meaning of their constituent parts (Kövecses 1986;
2002; Lakoff 1987), cognitive semantics sees them as conceptual analogy-
based cognitive models, consisting of two domains: a source and a target
domain. Their primary function, as conceived by cognitive linguistics,
is to help understand one concept in terms of another, by means of cor-
respondences2 between the elements of the two domains. The source
domain is a more concrete entity (such as hot fluid) that we rely on to
interpret a more abstract concept, the target domain (anger). This cor-
respondence between the source domain and the target domain is called
a conceptual metaphor.
The mappings between the two entities determine what conceptual
metaphor is behind the conceptualization of a given concept, in our case,
anger. These domains, however, tend to overlap, creating fuzzy categories
for the entailments.3
There have been studies investigating the role our metaphorical
thinking plays in figurative language understanding (Gibbs 1994). Gibbs
examined the role of conceptual metaphors in immediate idiom compre-
hension to see if people always access conceptual metaphors each time
they encounter and interpret an idiom. The findings indicate that people
do access conceptual metaphors when understanding idioms, but signifi-
cantly less so when processing literal paraphrases of idioms. Furthermore,
people access the appropriate conceptual metaphors, such as anger is
heat when processing idioms belonging to that conceptual domain (be
steaming, be fuming), but not when they read idioms (e.g., jump down
one’s throat) motivated by different conceptual metaphors (anger is an-
imal behavior). These findings provide evidence on the central role our
metaphorical mind plays in figurative language understanding, support-
2 We establish such entailments for the conceptual metaphor anger is pressure
in a container in the following way: pressure is anger; body is a container
for anger; cause/intensity of pressure is cause/intensity of anger; control over
pressure is control over anger; explosion of container is outburst of anger, etc.
(Kövecses 2002).
3 Since the general metaphor body is a container for anger includes other
minor metaphors, an expression belonging to the domain anger is a hot fluid
in a container entails that it also belongs to the body is a container for
anger metaphor. The same way, since heat and ﬁre are inseparable, expressions
in one domain (e.g., heat) often belong to the other domain (ﬁre) as well.
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ing the conceptual metaphor view (Lakoff–Johnson 1980; Gibbs 1992;
1994).
Grady et al. (1999) point out the limitations of the conceptual me-
taphor theory, claiming that the novel, inferential nature of metaphor
stemming from the emergent feature of the blending of different input
spaces in conceptual blending theory (as we will see later on) cannot be
captured explicitly within conceptual metaphor theory based on solely
bilateral (source-target) correspondences and projections. Lakoff and
Johnson’s theory is, however, highly consistent, and is complementary
to the proposed mentalizing model and its predicted mental interpreting
strategies.
1.3. The typology of idioms
Idioms (be boiling, be fuming) are non-literal expressions based on meta-
phors (Gibbs 1994), where the overall, intended meaning of the phrase
does not result from the summarized (literal) meanings of its individual
components. Traditional views of idiomaticity held that such phrases
were non-compositional, that is, their figurative meanings are directly
stipulated in the mental lexicon in the same way the meanings of indi-
vidual words are listed in a dictionary. Gibbs (ibid.) classifies idiomatic
phrases on the basis of the following two aspects:
From the morphological aspect he distinguishes decomposable and
non-decomposable idioms. The decomposable group entails those idioms
where the semantic interpretation of the component parts contributes to
their holistic, idiomatic meaning to a large extent (lay down the law, the
back of the chair, the neck of the bottle, etc.).
The opposite is true for non-decomposable idioms: their figurative
meanings cannot be derived from the sum of the meanings of its individual
components, but they encode a fairly independent figurative meaning
(shoot the breeze, hit the sack).
According to conventionality we distinguish conventional idioms
that are frequently used in everyday conversation (be exploding, lose one’s
head), as opposed to non-conventional phrases: the ones that are not fa-
miliar, for they are relatively rarely used4 (steal one’s thunder). And
4 Surely there can be individual diﬀerences in what one considers a rare or a fa-
miliar idiom, however, we do have generally conventional ones that are no doubt
frequently used—and thus their interpretation is facilitated by their familiarity.
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then we have the so-called dead metaphors, expressions that further un-
dergo a process of conventionalization, and their metaphorical meaning
becomes quite stable and fixed, either losing their early creative poten-
tial (anything referred to as dog means ‘bad’, ‘of no use’), or losing their
metaphorical nature—we have no other literal way of expressing them
(leg of the table, mouth of the river, etc).
The two distinctions can, of course, overlap, and we can talk about
idioms that are decomposable and conventional (play with fire), non-
decomposable and conventional (blow one’s trumpet), etc.
2. Major models of metaphor processing
(Cooper 1999)
2.1. Idiom-list hypothesis (Bobrow–Bell 1973)
Bobrow and Bell’s model, similarly to Searle’s (1979) theory of figurative
interpretation, suggests that people comprehend non-literal expressions
(kick the bucket, spill the beans) by first processing the phrase’s literal
meaning, and when seeing that the literal meaning does not fit the con-
text at hand, then, and only then do they directly retrieve the phrase’s
idiomatic meaning from the special phrasal lexicon “reserved” for frozen
figurative expressions (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1
The idiom-list hypothesis
This implies that people should have more difficulty understanding figu-
rative speech, and that the interpretation of idiomatic expressions takes
twice as long as that of literal ones. Burt (1992), Gibbs–Gonzales (1985),
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Gibbs et al. (1989) and Glucksberg–Keysar (1990) falsified these convic-
tions in experiments where people’s task was to judge the meaningfulness
of word phrases. Measuring participants’ reaction times they demon-
strated that, in a context supporting the idiomatic meaning, idiomatic
expressions took significantly less time to verify than literal phrases. The
bias participants had to interpret the expressions idiomatically right away
before recognizing their intended literal meaning, stems from the priming
effect the contexts convey in these cases, and from the poetic structure
of our mind (Lakoff–Johnson 1980; Gibbs 1986; Pléh–Thuma 2001).
This is also referred to as the metaphor interference effect, since
the metaphorical meaning was instantly noticed by participants, and in-
terfered with their ability to classify it simply as false. More recently,
the interference effect has been used to trace the mechanisms by which
metaphor is comprehended. Wolff and Gentner (2000) showed that the
interference effect is equally strong for reversed metaphors (some jails
are jobs) as for forward metaphors (some jobs are jails). This suggests
that metaphor processing begins with a symmetric alignment, as in the
structure-mapping model, rather than by a directional projection from
the concrete (vehicle) to the abstract (topic) domain.
2.2. Lexical representation hypothesis (Swinney–Cutler 1979)
Swinney and Cutler suggest that both the literal and the figurative mean-
ings may be simultaneously activated when we select the intended (id-
iomatic) meaning fitting the given context. The model states that idioms
are stored and retrieved from our mental lexicon in the same manner as
any other word or lexical ambiguity (Fig. 2).
The Swinney–Cutler model is attractive because it does not hypoth-
esize a special idiomatic processing mode and a default strategy, which
would be time consuming. Idioms here are understood as if they were
single words, not through a decompositional analysis requiring several
stages. However, the revolutionary finding (Burt 1992; Gibbs–Gonzales
1985; Gibbs et al. 1989; Glucksberg–Keysar 1990), that it takes the same
or less time to process figurative expressions than processing their literal
meanings, does not necessarily mean that both meanings are activated
simultaneously.
Further evidence is provided by tasks with story-context with final
sentences (He swallowed the bitter pill) having literal (took his medicine)
or idiomatic (endured the inconvenience) interpretations (Gibbs 1986).
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3. (contextualhelp)(INTENDED) MEANING
meanings are activated
Both 1. LITERAL and 2. FIGURATIVE
Idioms are stored as long expressions in the mental lexicon.
We choose the appropriate
Fig. 2
The lexical representation hypothesis
Participants’ task was to judge whether the sentence presented to them—
which was either (a) the literal, (b) the idiomatic interpretation of the
target sentence, (c) an unrelated or (d) an anomalous sentence—was a
meaningful English sentence.
The results suggest that participants were not substantially faster
in responding to the literal targets than they were to make the same
judgments for unrelated targets, thus it seems doubtful that both the
literal and the figurative meanings would be activated simultaneously
(Gibbs 1994). Burt (1992) and Mueller–Gibbs (1987) have demonstrated
that simultaneous activation is possible in cases of isolated idiomatic
expressions, that is, when there is no, or only a short context, which does
not assure idiomatic priming; and in contexts simultaneously supporting
both literal and idiomatic meanings.
2.3. Direct access hypothesis (Gibbs 1984)
Gibbs (1984; 1986; 1994) formulated this hypothesis on the basis of his
findings listed above as counter-arguments to the models mentioned. He
suggests that idiomatic expressions are interpreted just as easily as literal
ones, thus no special phase or extra time and effort is required. Idioms are
accessed directly in our mental lexicon, and it takes not more, but rather
less time to interpret figurative expressions than literal ones. People
therefore automatically compute the intended, non-literal meanings, due
to the poetic structure of the human mind (Fig. 3).
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Fig. 3
The direct access hypothesis
However, idioms differ, and a sufficient model should account for all
aspects of idiom processing. Conventional, familiar idioms have been
found to be interpreted faster than less familiar phrases (Schweigert 1991;
Blasko–Connine 1993). Some idioms are predominantly figurative (spill
the beans), whereas others (have one’s name on something, take one’s
medicine) have both literal and figurative uses that are practically equal
in frequency. Difficulty in understanding idioms depends on the given
phrase’s familiarity or conventionality, thus, this factor influences and
facilitates figurative interpretation to a large extent. The more frequent
the idiom is, the less time it takes to interpret it. However, this factor
is not controlled for in the model.
2.4. Composition model (Tabossi–Zardon 1993)
The composition model states that idioms are interpreted as sentences,
i.e., through decomposition, resulting in a holistic interpretation of the
phrase. Thus idiomatic phrases and expressions are compositional, where
the individual parts are functions of the intended, figurative meaning.
Therefore a semantic analysis based on the grammatical structure of the
phrase yields the idiomatic meaning of the expression at hand (Fig. 4).
Tabossi and Zardon give an explanation that applies only to the in-
terpretation of decomposable idioms, whose semantic analysis contributes
to their idiomatic meanings to a large extent (feet of the mountain, the
leg of the table, etc.). The model, however, does not apply to non-
decomposable expressions (kick the bucket, fly off the handle).
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 54, 2007
METAPHOR PROCESSING AND THE ACQUISITION OF IDIOMS 83
Fig. 4
The composition model
2.5. Conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier–Turner 1998)
Coulson and Oakley created a theory of online meaning construction, also
known as conceptual blending (Fauconnier–Turner 1998; Coulson–Oakley
2000). The theory represents a connectionist approach, delineating a
domain-general framework theory, functioning as an explanatory model
for linguistic and nonlinguistic blends as well (Fig. 5).
Blending theory describes different phases of a creative construction
of meaning, which happens through the integration of dynamic cogni-
tive models. The conceptual integration outlined by the blending the-
ory combines different conceptual spaces (input spaces, generic space,
blended space), and has an emergent structure of its own—thus having
a pragmatic reality.
Due to its indefinite, unspecific nature, it is applicable in a number
of different fields, such as anthropology, sociology, motion-detection, vi-
sion, and not exclusively in linguistics. This generality of the theory is
just as much a disadvantage, as it is an advantage: it assures versatility
and flexibility (and thus applicability in diverse disciplines), however, its
weakness stems from the lack of specificity for linguistic, in our case, id-
iomatic expressions. As a general framework theory of meaning construc-
tion, it may be relevant concerning the processing of idioms, because the
different cognitive stages of blending include the generation of inferences,
and thus of mental representations, through the integration of different
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Fig. 5
The conceptual blending theory
mental spaces. Veale and O’Donoghue (2000) claim that it solves three
problems rooted in the comprehension of metaphors, and thus of the
processing of idioms: relevance (i.e., what concepts are relevant to the
analogy or metaphor at hand), structural analysis (what the relationship
is between the relevant concepts invoked in the analogy), and recruitment
(what type of mappings, entailments need to be activated to construct
a coherent representation).
As for metaphor processing and understanding, Grady, Oakley and
Coulson (1999) compared the conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) (La-
koff–Johnson 1980) and the theory of conceptual blending (BT) (Fau-
connier–Turner 1998). The authors claim that the conceptual metaphor
theory addresses recurring patterns in figurative language, while blend-
ing theory focuses on the particulars of individual cases. Therefore, since
they address different aspects of metaphoric conceptualization, the two
approaches are complementary: the bilateral CMT mappings are inputs
to and constraints on the dynamic conceptual networks posited within
BT (Grady et al. 1999). The latter contributes to the inference residing
in new emergent structures with novel conceptualizations not ensured by
the conceptual metaphor theory alone.
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Conceptual blending theory, however, leaves a number of questions
unanswered. It does not go behind the scenes, it does not explain how
our mind actually constructs different mental spaces, in-between repre-
sentations that get integrated and blended, producing their own emergent
structures and final holistic, blended representations; how and why con-
ventional associations arise, and how cross-domain mappings are struc-
tured (Steen–Gibbs 1999; Grady et al. 1999). As Gibbs (2000) rightly
claims, it is not a single theory to be either confirmed or falsified. Its gen-
erality hinders its sufficient explanatory force, since it does not aim to
explain specific processes in their integrity—in our case the interpretation
of idioms. Thus, it is, in its present form, of no real explanatory value in
the case of idiomatic language use. The mentalistic model aims to clarify
such unanswered questions, and fill in existing gaps in the mentalistic
paradigm of today’s metaphor research.
3. Attempt to create a sufficient model
As we have seen, the above mentioned major models of metaphor inter-
pretation and thus of idiom processing currently prevailing in cognitive
psychology are of no sufficient explanatory value, and thus cannot reveal
the real representational mechanisms that work in the background of non-
literal language use. Models are often biased, focusing on one or the other
aspect of interpretation, giving answers only to compositional (Tabossi–
Zardon 1993), or to conventional idioms (Gibbs 1984). Modeling men-
tal interpretative processes from strictly one aspect (be it morphological
[decomposability] or statistical [conventionality]) cannot provide a valid
model for metaphor processing, and thus for figurative language use.
I would like to propose the need to look for mental processes in in-
vestigating interpretation and non-literal language use. We have seen in
Bobrow and Bell’s (1973) and in Searle’s model (1979) reflecting the Stan-
dard Pragmatic Model’s traditional approach that figurative language
use is claimed to be a secondary stage of interpretation, and to require
more time and effort from the reader/listener who deciphers non-literal
meaning. This, however, has been falsified by the findings of current
psycholinguistic experiments (Gibbs 1982; 1983; 1994; Gibbs–Gonzales
1985; Gibbs et al. 1989; Burt 1992). Measuring reaction times it was
found that people do not always interpret the literal meanings of indi-
rect or non-literal expressions during comprehension, in fact, in a context
supporting the idiomatic meaning people were much faster to select the
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intended (figurative) target (lose one’s head) than the literal one (lose
one’s key) (Glucksberg–Keysar 1990).
The conventionality of idioms (Swinney–Cutler 1979) further dis-
torts results, because people’s familiarity with one or the other idiom
can greatly facilitate interpretation, which might have influenced their
results. A sufficient model thus needs to control for the role of conven-
tionality in idiom processing.
3.1. Problems of definition
The above mentioned experiments yielded results demonstrating that it
takes not more, but rather less time for participants to interpret non-
literal expressions than literal ones, thus it does not require extra time
and effort. These findings prompted researchers to formulate the fol-
lowing two claims concerning figurative interpretation and language use
(Gibbs 1994, 109):
1. Comprehension does not take place in three distinct stages. Figurative interpre-
tation does not follow after an obligatory literal misanalysis.
2. Identical mental processes drive the comprehension of both literal and ﬁgurative
utterances.
The first claim has been widely accepted among researchers (Gibbs 1982;
1983; 1994; Gibbs–Gonzales 1985; Gibbs et al. 1989; Burt 1992). They
argue that figurative language is thus not deviant, and it does not require
more time or special cognitive processes to be understood.
On the basis of this conviction we could claim that the second state-
ment necessarily follows from the first one; however, it has not been
proved to be so. Although this finding is supported by Lakoff and John-
son’s widely accepted view of metaphors being an integral part of our
conceptual system and of the poetic nature of our mind facilitating figura-
tive language use, still, equivalence of processing times gives no assurance
that the same mental processes are involved in literal and in figurative
language comprehension. Something needs to account for the “twist”
in meaning, without unnecessary time-consuming stages and extra effort
hindering the interpretation process.
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3.2. The mentalistic model
I would like to argue for a mentalistic model which accepts the fact that
figurative language is different from, but not more difficult than literal
language use. The mentalistic component rooted in the so-called theory
of mind, a mentalizing ability which allows us to recognize others’ inten-
tions, bridges the gap in the realm of insufficient models of interpretation
(Fig. 6).
Fig. 6
The mentalistic model
A widely held assumption in today’s pragmatics and in contemporary
cognitive science is that recognizing speaker’s intention is of crucial im-
portance in non-literal language use, whether it is a discourse setting or
an idiomatic expression. Grice (1957; 1975), Pléh et al. (1997) in his
cooperative principle established four maxims of conversation, three of
which can be integrated into the fourth one: relevance (Sperber–Wilson
1986). Relevance functions as the major guideline in our interpretative
processes, and it thus plays a key role in idiomatic language comprehen-
sion as well.
Grice rightly claimed that in a conversation most of the information
is implied, rather than asserted. To be able to decipher such implicit
pieces of information, we rely on the guideline of relevance: what may
be relevant from the speaker’s point of view, supposing that they stay
cooperative (not violating the maxims of the cooperative principle). To
discover the relevant path in the conversation, we need to rely on our
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mentalizing, mind-reading ability, so-called intentionality, which allows
us to recognize speaker’s intention, and thus the intended referent of
the expression heard. This strategy allows us to decipher the intended
meaning of the utterance at hand.
3.2.1. Social-cognitive skills: the sine-qua-non of interpretation
Most researchers of cognitive development (Perner–Lang 1993; Tager-
Flusberg 1993; Leslie 1987; Csibra–Gergely 1998) invariably agree that
to explain our own and others’ behavior, to interpret others’ actions and
intentions, we rely on a complex of social skills and information, which
allows us to attribute mental states and intentions to others and to our-
selves.5 The mind reading ability rooted in theory of mind is a basic term
in cognitive psychology to explain cognitive processes such as learning,
language acquisition, social behavior, etc. Since it is so much part of our
cognition, it is a basic mental component of cognitive functions. In the
mentalistic model I propose, it plays a central role, and it thus accounts
for the ease and for the equal reaction times in current psycholinguis-
tic findings, without claiming that differences in figurative language use
necessarily mean difficulties and additional default strategies.
In the mentalizing model proposed here the addressee deciphers
intended meaning relying on their social-cognitive skills rooted in the
broader concept of intentionality, and in the mentalizing, mind-reading
ability based on theory of mind. It plays important roles in language
acquisition, having an especially important function in word learning
(Tomasello 1995; 1999; 2003), in the resolution of the problem of reference
described by Quine (Gleason–Ratner 1998) that is, in narrowing down
meaning. Furthermore, it is of crucial importance in holistic language use
in discourse, since it assures the baby’s emerging communicative skills in
the so-called proto-conversations. Our social-cognitive skills, thus, are
where our ToM (theory of mind), our mentalization-based mind-reading
ability stems from, constituting a basic component of social interaction
per se, of which language is a crucial, if not the most important com-
ponent and vehicle.
5 In today’s psychology this knowledge or cognition is called naive or folk psychol-
ogy.
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3.2.2. The cognitive developmental aspects of intentionality
It is a debated issue when exactly our basic social skill of interpreting
others’ actions and intentions is acquired. Some scholars believe it is
entirely (Pinker 1994; Fodor 1983; Meltzoff–Gopnik 1993b;a; Gopnik et al.
2000) or in part (Trevarthen 1979; 1993; Leslie 1987; Gergely 1996) an
innate human specific skill, whereas some say the acquisition begins at
12-15 months of age (Csibra–Gergely 1998). Tomasello (1999), one of the
major researchers of primate and infant early cognition holds that it is
at around 9–12 months of age that human infants begin to engage in a
set of new actions and behaviors.
The acquisition of this new skill of intentionality constitutes a kind
of “revolution” in that infants begin to understand the social world sur-
rounding them. At 9 months children engage in a so-called joint attention
behavior that seems to indicate the emerging understanding of other per-
sons as intentional agents, just like the self6 whose relations to the outside
world may be followed, shared and directed (Tomasello ibid.). Intentional
agents are seen as beings with feelings and purposes who make conscious
decisions so as to achieve certain goals. The appearance of joint attention
means that children for the first time begin to follow adults’ gaze, to look
where the adult is looking, and thus to engage with them in social inter-
action. This milestone is an important event in infants’ understanding
their own and therefore others’ intentional actions.
In the majority of cases at the preverbal age it happens via simula-
tion, when children engage in sensory-motor actions (e.g., imitation), and
achieve the previously seen goal with the same means. Then in the phase
of experimentation in the following few months of life (Piaget–Inhelder
1962; Baron-Cohen–Tager-Flusberg 1993) children try to achieve goals
with their own means, which shows that they have managed to under-
stand the causal relation between the purpose and the goal. This brings
them closer to identifying others’ actions as conscious acts, in which in-
tentions drive behavior.
3.2.3. Metarepresentation and theory of mind—the seeds of relevance
Cultural learning further enhances this process and engages the child
in social interactions, which leads to the acquisition of linguistic and
communicative competence. To achieve this, infants must understand the
communicative goal of what has been said, that is, they must decipher
6 A term in psychology to denote one’s own personality.
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what the speaker means. The acquisition of this ability, namely, theory
of mind is, therefore, the basic instinctive skill enabling further social-
cognitive and linguistic development, paving the way to the acquisition
of pragmatic competence. Theory of mind (a broader concept of which is
intentionality) is thus essential in supposing that the speaker is a rational,
intentional agent, whose action is conscious and goal-oriented. Therefore
the human instinct of attributing intentions to others is of key importance
in the interpretative theory of naive psychology: we employ this complex
of social deciphering skills to explain, to understand and to predict others’
behavior. This brings us to the recognition of the importance of relevance
in interpretation, which functions as a crucial guideline in deciphering
intended meaning, and thus, in figurative language comprehension.
There is still a long way to go before infants will understand false
beliefs, because that requires not only representation (symbolic interpre-
tation of the events or entities observed) but also metarepresentation,
that is, a representation of the representation (Sperber 2000).7 In other
words, children have to arrive at a stage when they are able to culturally
mediate their understanding of the world through the beliefs, convictions,
knowledge, opinion, intention of other persons. Therefore we can claim
that intentionality, and thus theory of mind assist in the acquisition of
early language, as we will see from the false belief tasks further on in
the study.
The precursors (that is, preceding developmental phases) of language
acquisition are thus the following (Tomasello 1999):
– Engaging in joint attention scenes which sets up a social-cognitive ground for acts
of symbolic (i.e., involving our representation of things, concepts and events),
including linguistic, communication.
– Understanding others as intentional agents.
– Theory of mind, essential in the understanding of not just intentions but of com-
municative intentions, in the separation of goals and means in actions and be-
havior, enabling the listener to infer the relevance of the adult’s utterance to the
goals it entails.
7 A ﬁrst level representation is the personal mapping of the world around us (draw-
ings, language, any other way of representing, i.e., materializing, capturing the
entities and stimuli of the world) (Peter knows. . . , Peter thinks. . . ., Peter is. . . ,
Peter wants. . . ). Metarepresentation is a second-level, dual representation, be-
cause it is a belief, conviction, thought, knowledge about someone else’s repre-
sentation (Peter believes that Kate knows/doesn’t know that. . . ) which eventually
can turn out to be a false belief (Baron-Cohen–Tager-Flusberg 1993).
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3.3. Theory of mind and cognitive development
Recently a number of studies (de Villiers–Pyers 1997; Csibra–Gergely
1998; Tomasello 1995; 1999) have demonstrated that the emergence of
theory of mind is not a clearly identifiable “leap” in cognitive develop-
ment, but it has several stages, beginning at about 8–9 months with its
precursors, then developing further between 2–4 years of age. The major
social cognitive revolution when the child’s interpretative competence in
social interaction finally becomes close to that of an adult’s is at around
the age of four. Of course these parameters constantly change according
to individual differences in cognitive and social development.
The present study relies on perspectives from developmental psy-
chology, namely, on the cognitive development scheme introduced above,
of whose major representatives are Perner–Lang (1993); Gergely (1996);
de Villiers–Pyers (1997); Csibra–Gergely (1998); Tomasello (1999). All re-
searchers agree that the acquisition of social-cognitive skills, among them
theory of mind is a gradual cognitive development, the phases of which
are hard to capture and define. Therefore, the timely aspect of their
appearance is debated. However, most scientists agree that the relevant
turning point as for interpretative skills (be they social or linguistic) is
at around the age of four (ibid.).
3.4. Children’s idiomatic language acquisition
Langacker states that language is a form of cognition, packaged for pur-
poses of interpersonal communication (Langacker 1987). Taking part
in a conversation thus requires thinking for speaking (Tomasello 1999),
because effective human symbolic communication requires some unique
forms of conceptualization. Speakers often create figurative analogies
when the resources of their linguistic inventory are insufficient to express
themselves so as to reflect their point of view. Therefore such linguistic
constructions can be conceptualized as mental categories, and thus as
cognitive symbols.
It is by now widely accepted in cognitive and functional linguistics
that metaphors permeate even the most ordinary uses of natural lan-
guage (e.g., Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987; Gibbs 1994). Parents regularly
try to educate children telling them to toe the line or to put that out
of your mind, or don’t lose your head, etc. Comprehending these fig-
urative ways of expression helps children acquire the ability of drawing
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analogies between the familiar concrete domains and the more abstract
domains of social and mental life they are learning about (Tomasello
1999). As for the further development of idiomatic language use and
pragmatic competence, having acquired a number of “initial” metaphori-
cal constructions children gradually become able to construct broad and
individual expressions, leading to productivity. Because of the complex
relational mappings of metaphors it is, at first, difficult to understand
and to decipher idioms, unless context has a facilitating effect.
The comprehension of idiomatic language requires the construing of
aspects of reality in metaphorical, analogically based ways (Lakoff 1987;
Tomasello 1999), for which they rely on theory of mind rooted in their
social cognitive skills. Children encounter this aspect of language use in
their native tongue; they must deal with it, and eventually, come to use it.
4. Experiment
Idiomatic language use requires communicative and pragmatic compe-
tence, that is, it requires the participants to be able to comprehend and
use non-transparent, opaque constructions. It also requires that they
rely on mentalization in interpreting, rather than on language itself (that
is, they do not interpret the utterance word by word literally, but fig-
uratively, through mentalization). In light of all this, I suppose that a
key element needed in this process lies in the mastery of theory of mind.
Therefore I hypothesize that children without developed ToM skills (just
as children with autism, Tomasello 1999 argues), will have more difficulty
in comprehending metaphors and idiomatic language, than their mates
with mentalization skills.
The following tasks constitute the framework of my experiment:
1. Theory of mind assessment with unseen displacement false belief task.
2–3. Simile task vs. metaphor task (relying on Happé 1993 and Gibbs 1994).
4.1. Method
My subjects were 45 kindergarten aged children.8 They were all be-
tween 3 and 6 years of age. The experiment was carried out in a local
8 Since there was no correlation between the factors of gender and performance,
I do not analyze such interference, and therefore, I do not explicitly state the
proportion of girls vs. boys in my sample.
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kindergarten, relying on the three tasks above: First I divided the group
of children into two groups according to their performance on the false
belief test measuring their mentalization skills (see Appendix). Then I
compared the performance of the ToM group (those passing the test)
and of the No ToM group (those failing the test) in the simile condi-
tion, and in the metaphor condition (i.e., I confronted the literal vs. the
metaphorical interpretation skills of children) using SPSS program of sta-
tistical analysis. Since my subjects were admitted to the kindergarten, I
regarded their admission as a test of general intelligence. Thus, I did not
carry out a separate IQ measurement and placement test, but accepted
their kindergarten status as an indicator of their intelligence being in the
normal range, so as to exclude the possibility of the results being affected
by differences in intelligence of the different groups of children.
The simile condition serves a control role, since it requires only literal
interpretation of target phrases on the part of children. According to
Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) relevance theory, similes are comparisons
(metaphors) made explicit by the word like, and thus can be interpreted
decompositionally, through a semantic analysis. Sally is like an angel is
syntactically not different from saying Sally is like her mother (Happé
1993).
The successful completion of the metaphor task however, requires
some understanding of intentions, and therefore, mentalization skills, so
as to decipher intended meaning. In a metaphor, the propositional form
of the utterance is a flexible interpretation of the speaker’s thought. Since
literal interpretation is not sufficient, children need to decipher the rele-
vant, intended meaning, for which they need to, at least in part, rely on
their social-cognitive skills, namely, ToM.
Both simile and metaphor tasks consisted of (a) and (b) parts (see
Appendix). In part (a) children had to select the right answer in a multi-
ple choice test that was read out to them (Happé ibid.). In part (b) chil-
dren listened to a short story, the last sentence of which was idiomatic.
They had to answer questions about the target sentence. The correct
answer was the figurative meaning supported by the context. Children
could earn 1 point with each correct answer; therefore the maximum
score was 20.
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4.2. Hypotheses
1. The social cognitive skills of children who do not have ToM are behind
those with mentalization skills. Test: false belief test.
2. Children not capable of mentalization do well in the simile task, since it
requires only literal interpretation of an explicit statement. Test: simile
task.
3. Children with no ToM skills fail the metaphor task, but those in the
ToM group do significantly well in the metaphor task measuring figurative
language use. Test: metaphor task.
4.3. Results
4.3.1. False belief test
18 children passed the test, forming the ToM group, while 27 children
failed the test, and thus became members of the No ToM group.
4.3.2. Simile condition
In the simile condition (F(1.43) = 0.5, psimile > 0.05) the two groups’
performance was not significantly different. Those without mentalization
skills did just as well in the task requiring literal interpretation, as their
mates from the ToM group (Fig. 7).
Fig. 7
Results in the similie condition
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4.3.3. Metaphor condition
In the task requiring figurative interpretation and thus the deciphering of
intended meaning, those with mentalization skills did significantly better
than those without ToM (F(1.43) = 134, pmetaphor < 0.01). There was no
interaction between the simile and the metaphor conditions (Fig. 8).
Fig. 8
Results in the similie condition
4.4. Discussion
1. My results suggest that theory of mind ability correlates with social-
cognitive skills and pragmatic competence.
2. Children without mentalization skills do just as well in tasks measuring
literal interpretation as their mates with more developed social-cognitive
skills.
3. Children with ToM, relying on their mentalizing, and thus intention
reading abilities succeed in deciphering intended meaning, and therefore
pass tests measuring figurative language understanding and use, whereas
those without or with less developed intention reading skills fail the test.
The results of my research confirmed the prediction that the acqui-
sition of theory of mind is an important factor in figurative language use
and comprehension, and in general, in drawing inferences in everyday
communication. The deciphering strategies based on mind reading and
metarepresentation proposed by the mentalizing model are highly con-
sistent with developmental psychological findings concerning children’s
social cognitive and communicative development (Baron-Cohen–Tager-
Flusberg 1993; Csibra–Gergely 1998; Tomasello 1999; Gopnik et al. 2000;
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 54, 2007
96 ZSUZSANNA SCHNELL
Sperber 2000; Hamvas 2001). Acquiring the mentalizing ability and rely-
ing on their social cognitive skills rooted in ToM, children become capable
of thinking with others’ heads, decipher their goals, beliefs and then false
beliefs, and thus the intended, figurative meaning of their utterances.
Therefore they become almost adult-like participants in a conversation,
with smooth handling of non-literal expressions and discourse organiza-
tion rules. This pragmatic competence emerges at around 4 years of
age (Perner–Lang 1993; Tomasello 1999), giving green light to further
cognitive, social and communicative development.
Relevance theory relates the degree of metarepresentational ability to
the degree of communicative ability and thus to pragmatic competence in
a specific way: practically identifying the two. Therefore theory of mind is
regarded as the basis of holistic and thus of idiomatic language use. ToM
in itself, however, may not be a sufficient factor in figurative language use.
Recent studies hypothesize that other cognitive and linguistic factors may
also contribute to figurative language comprehension. Norbury (2005)
claims that first-order theory of mind abilities do not ensure metaphor
comprehension, instead, semantic ability (broad enough semantic repre-
sentations) is a stronger predictor of performance in idiomatic language
use. Another study (Babarczy–Szamarasz 2006) investigated whether
the crucial factor in metaphor comprehension is theory of mind (Sperber
–Wilson 1986; Happé 1993; Sperber 2000), or rather, as Gentner suggests
(Wolff–Gentner 2000; Gentner–Bowdle 2001), analogical (or symmetric)
alignment. Their subjects were patients with Williams syndrome, whose
social-cognitive skills are impaired, however, their perceptual-cognitive
skills are intact (Tager-Flusberg–Sullivan 2000). Their findings indicate
that ToM skills do not necessarily correlate with metaphor processing
skills. The performance of subjects with WS on metaphor tasks was bet-
ter than expected, but their mentalizations skills were far behind those
of the control group.
Both of these two counter-examples are, however, studies investigat-
ing subjects with cognitive or language impairments, whereas the mental-
izing model aims to answer questions concerning the idiomatic language
use of normal populations. Therefore, the claims against the prevailing
importance of theory of mind, and the emphasized role of broad semantic
representations may not be valid for normal cases of metaphor processing
and idiom use. Karmiloff-Smith–Karmiloff (2002) point out that we shall
not generalize concerning the functioning and development of a healthy
mind based on evidence from atypical cases. Patients with WS tend to
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have seemingly extraordinary lexical skills, whereas their cognitive abili-
ties are fairly poor. Therefore we need to be cautious with generalizations
from atypical cases of brain and language development.
5. Conclusions—The validity of the mentalizing model
Gibbs himself states in the third chapter of Poetics of mind (1994, 119):
“My claim that ﬁgurative language understanding does not require special
mental processes still leaves many important questions unanswered. Exactly
how does common ground (the shared beliefs and knowledge held by speak-
ers and listeners in context) constrain ﬁgurative language interpretation?”
The mind-reading strategy rooted in theory of mind may fill the gaps in
Gibb’s theory: Our intention-reading ability assures that the idiomatic
phrase at hand will be interpreted in the intended, figurative meaning,
through mentalization. Gibbs (op.cit., 114–5) suggests that
“we need to try to identify processes that seem special to diﬀerent types of
ﬁgurative language and demonstrate that they play important roles for all
types of language, and therefore, are not special after all.”
As I have already pointed out above, the mentalizing model proposed
here accepts that figurative language is different from (i.e., special), but
not more difficult than literal language use (not special, after all). The
mentalistic model relies on the same processes to interpret metaphor as
it does to understand other aspects of speech. As I have pointed out,
theory of mind plays important roles in language acquisition, especially
in the acquisition of the lexicon, and in coping with the problem of refer-
ence when narrowing down the meaning of a new word. ToM contributes
to finding the intended referent in both literal and figurative language to
a large extent. Therefore, the mentalistic model seems most consistent
with the available psychological and psycholinguistic evidence showing
that metaphor understanding does not require a special mental process
that would not be present in first language acquisition (Baron-Cohen
–Tager-Flusberg 1993; Perner–Lang 1993; Gibbs 1994; Csibra–Gergely
1998; Tomasello 1999; Sperber 2000), and gives us an insight into so-
lutions to remaining questions in today’s cognitive linguistic research,
models (Bobrow–Bell 1973; Swinney–Cutler 1979; Gibbs 1984; Tabossi–
Zardon 1993), and complements, thus contributes to the integrity of cur-
rent mentalistic theories (blending theory, conceptual metaphor theory).
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Therefore, the mentalistic model not only leads to predictions about
idiomatic language acquisition, but it also generates new methods and
strategies in the investigation of human language and cognition.
Appendix
Task 1: Theory of mind measuring false belief task—unseen displacement
The following story of an unexpected transfer was told and played to each child
using puppets (Perner–Lang 1993, 151):
The protagonist puts an object into location A. In her absence the object is
unexpectedly transferred into location B, so that she mistakenly believes that the
object is still in location A. To assess children’s understanding of the main character’s
belief they are asked where the protagonist will look for the object when she comes in:
Little Sally has just finished eating the sweets she got for Christmas. She puts
the box of chocolate onto the top shelf above her bed. When she goes out to play in
the garden, her Mom comes in to clean the room and puts the box of chocolate into
the drawer.
Where will little Sally look for the chocolate box when she comes in?
Simile vs. metaphor tasks
Task 2: Simile condition
(a) Multiple choice test (Happé 1993, 119)
(1) The dog was so wet. It was like. . . (a walking puddle). . .
(2) Carol glared at Nicola. She was so cross. Her eyes were like. . . (daggers). . .
(3) The night sky was so clear. The stars were like. . . (diamonds). . .
(4) Simon just couldn’t make Lucy understand. She was like. . . (a brick wall). . .
(5) Caroline was so embarrassed. Her face was like. . . (beetroot). . .
Choose one item from the following list to complete each sentence:
a brick wall
dresses
daggers
a beetroot
a walking puddle
diamonds
(b) Story ending (Gibbs 1994)
1.
Johnny’s grandpa was a very nice old man. He loved his family, and always took little
Johnny ﬁshing to the lake and helped him catch ﬁsh for dinner. Johnny always ran
ahead, he was so happy to go, but grandpa could not be jumping with joy, but he
walked very slowly because he was old as the hills.
Q: What was Johnny’s grandpa like? Why couldn’t he run? Why is he like the hills?
2.
Dan and his friends went to the hills one day to pick ﬂowers. They went on a big
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hike and got back home late in the evening. Dan’s mom cooked a tasty dinner, and
the family talked for long about the wonderful day spent in the forest. Dan had a big
dinner, and it made him so sleepy that he yawned like a lion.
Q: How did Dan yawn? Why was his yawn like a lion’s?
3.
The daughter of the king of Sunland was the most beautiful princess on earth. Many
princes and kings wanted to marry her, and they all fought with the dragon who
wanted to steal the princess. She had golden hair, bright, happy eyes, and her cheeks
were like red roses.
Q: Why were her cheeks like roses? What was the same between the cheeks and the
roses?
4.
Grandma was working all day in her garden. She started watering her ﬂowers in the
morning. She went color by color, starting ﬁrst with the yellow ones, then with the
blue ones, the white ones, the red ones, and it was already late evening by the time
she ﬁnished. Grandma got really tired, so she went to bed early to have a good night’s
sleep. Then, next morning she got up fresh as a daisy!
Q: Why was grandma like a daisy in the morning?
5.
Grumpy the dragon was a very ugly animal. He was not cruel, but he looked so
frightening that everyone ran away when they saw him. He liked cakes and cookies
very much. He also ate healthy things, such as fruit, broccoli, even milk and cereals,
but when he found some cookies, he could not control himself and ate like a pig.
Q:Why did Grumpy eat cookies like a pig? Did he eat fruits and broccoli like a pig too?
Task 3: Metaphor condition
(a) Multiple choice test
(1) The dancer was so graceful. She really was. . . (a swan). . .
(2) Father was very very angry. He really was. . . (a volcano). . .
(3) Michael was so cold. His nose really was. . . (an icicle). . .
(4) John was very clever and tricky. He really was. . . (a fox). . .
(6) Ann always felt safe with Tom. He really was. . . (a safe harbor). . .
Choose one item from the following list to complete each sentence:
an icicle
a fox
a safe harbor
a hat
a swan
a volcano
(b) Story ending
1.
Johnny is helping his mother make a cake. She leaves him to add the eggs to the ﬂour
and sugar. But silly Johnny doesn’t break the eggs ﬁrst—he just puts them into a
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bowl, shells and all! What a silly thing to do! When mother comes back and sees what
Johnny has done, she says: “Your head is made out of wood!”
Q: What does Johnny’s mother mean? Does she mean Johnny is clever or silly?
2.
Judy was a very shy girl. She was afraid of meeting people she had never seen before,
but, loved playing in the garden. She went out to run around and play with her
puppet, chase butterﬂies and sing with the birds no matter if it rained or snowed. She
had no friends because she was too shy to talk to new children. One spring she went
to the mountains with her parents. They stayed at a hotel, near a lake. Her mother
told her that there were children in the hotel, and that she should try to meet them.
She went out to play with them, and she managed to make friends. Her parents were
very happy that Judy broke the ice.
Q: Why were Judy’s parents happy? What did she do when she broke the ice?
3.
Sarah did not like to help her mom do the housework. She preferred watching TV,
playing with her dolls, or playing puzzle. One day her mom got home very late from
work, and she had no time to cook dinner. She asked Sarah to help her with the
preparation. Sarah did not do it, she sneaked into her room to back out from her task.
Then her mom got very angry, came into her room and said very strictly: Sarah, now
you help me lay the table or you will get no dinner! Sarah could not do anything else,
but swallow the bitter pill.
Q: What did Sarah need to do? Was she happy to do it?
4.
Danny’s grandma loves gardening. She spends her mornings, her afternoons, and
her evenings in the garden, planting colorful, happy little ﬂowers, adoring butterﬂies,
bugs, picking strawberries, blueberries, watering apple trees. She only goes in from
the garden at lunchtime to prepare lunch for little Danny who goes to visit her every
day after school. The garden has tens of thousands of roses, many types of daisies,
violets and all sorts of ﬂowers that have a wonderful scent in the spring breeze. Danny
really enjoys picking berries and playing among the old fruit trees. One day he went
to visit his grandma and he spent such a wonderful afternoon there that he cried out
in happiness: “Grandma, I am so glad you have a green thumb!”
Q: What did Danny mean by saying this to her grandma? Were her fingers dirty?
5.
Cindy liked being with people. She always wanted to know what happened to whom,
how and why. But not only did she want to know it, she always told it to others.
One day her best friend, Sandy came to tell her great news, and she said: Cindy, you
can’t imagine what happened to me! I am so happy! It is a secret; I do not want
others to know it. My grandpa bought me a white horse for my birthday! But now
promise me you button your lip!
Q: What does Sandy mean? What does she want Cindy to do?
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